The scandinavian regional model : accounting for the shift from convergence to divergence by Torfing, Jacob et al.
The scandinavian regional model: accounting for the 
shift from convergence to divergence 
Jacob Torfing, Anders Lidström and Asbjørn Røiseland* 
SJPA 
19(4) 
 
Abstract 
This article maps how the sub-national regional levels of governance in Denmark, Nor-
way and Sweden have changed from a high degree of institutional convergence to a pat-
tern of institutional divergence. It analyses the similarities and differences in the changes 
in regional governance and discusses how these changes can be understood. Our supposi-
tion is that the more or less rational explanations of change found in main strands of the 
new institutionalism fail to explain the recent reforms of regional governance. Conse-
quently, we ourselves have to contend with explanations in which rational action plays a 
limited role and contingent articulations of political and institutional conditions, together 
with spillover effects from reforms of local governance structures, are central to under-
standing the reforms that have produced the increasingly divergent patterns of regional 
governance in Scandinavia.  
 
Introduction  
The 1970s marked the beginning of a general strengthening of the sub-national 
regional level of governance in Europe. This was mainly a response to the failure 
of previously centralised states to handle increasingly complex matters in a more 
globalised economy. Not only were entirely new levels of regional government 
established, existing regions also received additional powers (Hooghe, Marks 
and Schakel 2010, Heinelt and Bertrana 2011, Lidström 2011). The process was 
reinforced in the 1990s with devolution prompted by further challenges to the 
nation state, a more explicit regionalisation agenda from the EU and demands 
for ethnic self-government. A contributing factor was also the shift in regional 
development policies from a reliance on state redistribution to a “New Regional-
ist” agenda that emphasised the regions’ own responsibility for their develop-
ment. A development achievable by coordination of the various resources that 
are available to local and regional actors, sometimes supported by additional 
means from the EU or central government. The coordinated actors not only in-
cluded elected local and regional government and other public sector agencies, 
but also private firms and civil society organisations (Keating and Loughlin 
1997, Keating 1998, Baldersheim 2000, Lidström 2007).  
In the Scandinavian countries, the intermediate regional level has tradition-
ally been weak. The unitary state and the municipal level have been favoured in 
the Nordic welfare system, although some welfare functions that require a larger  
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population base have been allocated to intermediate county councils – 
amtskommuner in Denmark, fylkeskommuner in Norway and landsting in Swe-
den. Indeed, by the early 1980s, following reforms in Norway and Denmark, the 
county council level in the three countries had become very similar in terms of 
position, function and size. They were now all directly elected, were responsible 
for hospitals and some secondary education, had powers of general competence 
and taxing powers, and had average populations of about 2-400,000 inhabitants 
(Lidström 2003). This coincided with an exceptional expansion of the welfare 
systems in the Nordic countries, and more generally with the rise of public ex-
penditure in the Western world (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). Although signifi-
cant differences remained, it is still relevant to talk about the convergence to a 
common Scandinavian county council model during this period of time (Sand-
berg 2005, Mydske 2006).  
However, by 2014, the common Scandinavian model had been replaced by 
three different models, as summarised in Table 1. Danish regions have become 
the strongest in terms of the size of the population, but the weakest with regard 
to powers and functions. Swedish intermediates have retained much of their 
position and even become stronger where regions have been set up. Norwegian 
county councils lost powers and functions, not least due to the 2001 hospital 
reform removing about two-thirds of their activities. 
Nevertheless, there were also a few clear characteristics of the changes. One 
common tendency is that the role of the intermediate level in coordinating other 
actors, in particular in regional development, has increased in all three countries 
(although there are significant differences between counties in Sweden) 
(Hörnström 2013). In most other respects, the county councils/regions have 
different functions in the three countries. For example, responsibility for hospi-
tals remains fully in the hands of Swedish county councils, is limited to a re-
sponsibility for financing and providing somatic and psychiatric treatment in the 
Danish regions, and is totally removed from the Norwegian county councils 
(Byrkjeflot and Neby 2008, Magnussen, Vrangbaek and Saltman 2009). Alt-
hough there is also a tendency towards a stronger emphasis on regional devel-
opment functions, the general tendency is still towards divergence. 
During the era of New Regionalism, it might have been expected that the 
Scandinavian model would have continued to develop its common characteris-
tics and along similar lines. As all three countries have basically been subject to 
the same pressures of globalisation, Europeanisation and competition, it would 
have been reasonable to assume that similarities would have been strengthened 
through similar types of reforms. These could have included amalgamations of 
county councils into larger regional units and transfer of full responsibility for 
regional development to these regions. However, although New Regionalism 
also made an impact in the Scandinavian countries (Hörnström 2013), the solu-
tions selected were very different in each country and were made according to 
national priorities rather than as adjustments to New Regionalism. A conse-
quence was a shattering of the previous unified model. 
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Table 1 The regional levels of government in Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
1980 and 2014 
 Denmark Sweden Norway 
 1980 2014 1980 2014 1980 2014 
Number 
and type  
14 County 
councils 
(amts-
kom-
muner) 
5 Regions 24 County 
councils 
(landsting) 
17 County 
councils 
(land-
sting), 4 
regions* 
19 County 
councils 
(fylkes-
kom-
muner) 
19 County 
councils 
(fylkes-
kom-
muner) 
Avarage 
population  
366,000 1,125,000 346,000 460,000 215,000 267,000 
Taxing 
powers 
Yes No  Yes Yes Yes, but 
fixed 
percentage 
Yes, but 
fixed 
percentage 
Powers of 
general 
compe-
tence 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Major own 
functions 
Hospitals, 
secondary 
education, 
roads, 
environ-
mental 
regulation, 
regional 
busses and 
trains, 
specialised 
social care 
Hospitals, 
regional 
busses and 
trains, 
some 
specialised 
social care 
Health 
care, 
dental care 
for young 
and elder-
ly, public 
transport, 
some 
secondary 
education 
Health 
care, 
dental care 
for young 
and elder-
ly, public 
transport, 
some 
secondary 
education 
Hospitals,  
dental care 
for young 
and elder-
ly, sec-
ondary 
education, 
regional 
roads, 
public 
transport 
Dental 
care for 
young and 
elderly, 
secondary 
education, 
regional 
roads, 
public 
transport 
Major 
coordinat-
ing func-
tions 
Regional 
planning 
and devel-
opment 
Regional 
planning 
and devel-
opment 
 Public 
health 
activities, 
regional 
develop-
ment (in 
regions) 
 Regional 
and rural 
develop-
ment, 
water 
manage-
ment, 
public 
health 
activities 
Note: * By 2017, there will be 8 county councils and 13 regions 
 
Why did this happen and how can the process and outcome be understood? An 
initial impression is that no single theory of context-dependent decision-making 
seems to be able to account for this shift from convergence to divergence. It 
cannot be seen as an expression of institutional rationalism, whether based on 
actor calculations, isomorphism/policy transfer, or path-dependency. Instead, we 
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need to look for alternative ways of understanding the process, based on the 
assumption that the underlying logic is much more temporal and non-rational. 
This article aims to map how the regional levels of governance in the Scan-
dinavian countries have changed from the early 1980s and onwards, analysing to 
what extent there are similarities and differences in these changes, and discuss-
ing how these changes may be understood. In the next section, the theoretical 
framework is presented, with particular focus on rationalist vs non-rationalist 
explanations of reform change. This is followed by an overview and analysis of 
the reform processes in each of the three Scandinavian countries and the extent 
to which these can be accounted for by the different theories. In a final section, 
the results are compared and the conclusions summarised. 
 
Scandinavian regional reforms – alternative ways of account-
ing for institutional change 
The regional levels of governance are founded on fundamental governance struc-
tures that provide a set of constitutional rules that establish and regulate a broad 
range of different administrative departments, agencies and networks that pro-
vide operational procedures for the production of public services and authorita-
tive decisions for citizens and private stakeholders. As such, the reform of the 
regional governance structures amounts to a ‘third order change’ that transforms 
the constitutional rules that regulate the formation of collective and operational 
rules (Ostrom 1990). 
The county councils and their supporting administrations are institutional 
governance structures authorising particular actors to produce public governance 
in accordance with a large array of normative, regulatory and procedural rules 
and on the basis of a particular distribution of resources. When explaining Scan-
dinavian county reforms it is, therefore, obvious to look for theoretical inspira-
tion in the ever expanding toolbox of the new institutionalism. The various 
strands of the new institutionalism all share the basic assumption that ‘institu-
tions matter’ when it comes to explaining social and political reforms. Hence, 
although social and political agency is seen as the key driver of change, it is 
assumed that social and political action to a varying degree is structured, condi-
tioned and shaped by institutional rules, norms and procedures as well as by 
institutionalised forms of knowledge and discourse (Peters 2012). 
Rational choice institutionalism explains institutional change as a result of 
rational self-interested actions of individual and/or collective actors who are 
responding to changes in the environment. External events and structural trans-
formations in the political and socioeconomic context will tend to alter the pref-
erences of the rational actors who, subsequently, will change the institutional 
governance structures in order to ensure that they match their new preferences 
and the changing contextual conditions (March and Olsen 1995). In their effort 
to change the institutional structures social and political actors face different 
options regarding the institutional design. The institutional context in which the 
rational actors are operating may structure their choices and influence the pay-
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off matrix, but it does not prevent the actors from making a rational choice with-
in the given set of institutional constraints (Ostrom 1990). As such, there is plen-
ty of room for social and political agency to change the fundamental governance 
structures so that they are aligned with their preferences and the environmental 
conditions. When applied to public sector reforms the rational actors are often 
assumed to be executive public managers aiming to maximise their budgets or 
task portfolio (Dunleavy 1991) or private interest organisations aiming to influ-
ence government decisions (Scharpf 1997). However, we should not forget that 
political parties and politicians can also be seen as rational actors aiming to 
shape the public sector on the basis of political preferences influenced by politi-
cal ideologies and strategic concerns. In fact most of the standard theories of 
party behaviour make rational assumptions about how political parties within a 
given set of constraints behave in ways that maximise their chance of winning 
elections, participating in government and major political agreements, and realis-
ing their political programme (Sjöblom 1968, Strøm 1990). However, when 
explaining regional governance reforms from the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism, we should not only be able to identify the rational pursuit of 
clearly formulated political preferences, but also events and structural transfor-
mations that have caused the political actors to change their preferences in ways 
that call for a redesign of the institutional forms of governance. If politicians 
reform regional governance something must have changed their preferences. 
Historical institutionalism is less optimistic with regard to the possibility of 
intentional reform of institutional governance structures due to the existence of 
institutionally embedded lock-in mechanisms (March and Olsen 1995). The 
contingent choice of particular institutional forms of governance will over time 
tend to generate a positive feedback from the social and political actors who 
operate within the stable institutional structures. The actors learn to manoeuvre 
within the institutional structures and they benefit from the general acceptance 
and stability of the institutional structures that allow them to use their acquired 
skills, reduce uncertainty and exploit economies of scale. In this situation the 
costs of transforming the institutional structures will seem insurmountable, and 
the concurrence of increasing benefits from the preservation of the status quo 
and high transformation costs of large-scale reforms means that even sub-
optimal institutional solutions will tend to persist (Pierson 1994). Changes may 
occur when the logic of the institutional path is problematized by external 
events, but the changes will tend to be relatively small and in continuity rather 
than discontinuity with the past (Torfing 2009). Large changes leading to the 
establishment and institutionalisation of a new path are rare and tend to be a 
result of cataclysmic shocks that dislocate the old path and open a terrain for 
political struggles aiming to shape the new path. In such situations the social and 
political actors may rationally pursue particular interests although their rational 
action will be bounded due to the lack of information and decision-making re-
sources. In addition, the interests pursued by social and political actors will tend 
to be shaped through processes of mutual learning and by the common frames of 
reference that have developed among the actors in the particular policy field, and 
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that will tend to make the reforms less radical. Hence, when it comes to explain-
ing reforms of regional governance from the perspective of historical institution-
alism the expectation is that change will either be limited and incremental or 
triggered by an external shock that completely shatters the existing governance 
structures and the path-dependency that it fosters.  
Sociological institutionalism emphasises the normative integration of social 
and political actors who act in accordance with the logic of appropriate action 
prescribed by the institutional context in which they are situated. Change is for 
the most part small and results either from context-specific reinterpretations of 
rules and norms or from experimental learning processes (March and Olsen 
1995). Large-scale institutional reforms are explained as a result of isomorphic 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In order to survive it is more important 
for public and private organisations to be legitimate in the eyes of external actors 
than to be efficient. As long as they follow the changing organisational fads, 
their chance of surviving seems to be good. As such, organisations are subjected 
to coercive pressures from superior authorities, mimetic pressures from other 
organisations in the same field, and normative pressures from new generations of 
employees who are equipped with new ideas about how to govern. When organi-
sations adjust their institutional designs in accordance with the different kinds of 
pressures, the inevitable result is a growing homogeneity in the organisational 
field. Organisations look the same because they are subjected to the same organ-
isational fads. However, contextual reinterpretation of new organisational fash-
ions, selective and incomplete implementation and local learning processes tend 
to put boundaries on the homogenising effects of the isomorphic pressures. Nev-
ertheless, when it comes to explaining regional governance reform from the 
perspective of sociological institutionalism, the expectation will be that reforms 
are motivated by the attempts to enhance legitimacy by doing what others are 
doing or recommending. 
In summary, the three institutional theories provide different perspectives on 
regional governance reforms. Seen from the perspective of rational choice insti-
tutionalism, we would expect regional governance reforms to be driven by ra-
tional actors who ensure the efficiency of history by redesigning institutions in 
order to match preferences shaped by significant societal developments. Viewed 
through the lens of historical institutionalism, we would expect sizeable regional 
governance reforms to emerge in the wake of major crises and external shocks 
that destabilise the existing path and thus create a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ that 
facilitates path-shaping. Finally, the sociological institutionalist perspective 
makes us expect that sizeable regional governance reforms are a result of ho-
mogenising mimetic pressures that urge countries to imitate trends and reforms 
from other countries in the hope that they will enhance their legitimacy. 
Despite their theoretical and explanatory differences, the three institutional-
ist theories all seem to rely on a somewhat rational explanation of regional gov-
ernance reforms that fails to capture the contingent interplay between political 
and institutional logics. Rational choice institutionalism assumes that social and 
political actors aim to make rational adjustments of fundamental governance 
The Scandinavian Regional Model  
 
 
 
 
13 
structures to reflect new and emerging conditions and preferences. Historical 
institutionalism tends to think that learning effects, increasing returns to scale 
and high transformation costs make it rational for social and political actors to 
stick to the established path despite the existence of alternative institutional 
designs that potentially have a higher performance on key parameters. Finally, 
sociological institutionalism believes that the adoption of the latest fad is instru-
mental in preserving and enhancing organisational legitimacy, which appears to 
be more important than efficiency for securing long-term survival. Although 
historical institutionalism - with its emphasis on path-dependent sub-optimality - 
and bounded rationality and sociological institutionalism - with its emphasis on 
the pressure to adopt the latest fashion in order to improve legitimacy - seek to 
escape the idea that change is driven by rational action based on exogenously 
given preferences, there is still a considerable remnant of rationalism in both of 
these branches of the new institutionalism in the sense that actors are assumed to 
either preserve the status quo, if they stand to benefit from that, or reform institu-
tions in order to enhance legitimacy and the chance of survival.  
An alternative theoretical point of departure would view regional govern-
ance reforms as a result of contingent and temporal articulations of governance 
problems, new available solutions, emerging occasions for collective action and 
political actors who are driven by political moods and impulses, short-term 
gains, tactical games and idiosyncratic beliefs rather than by carefully calculated 
strategies aiming to realise a set of hierarchically ordered preferences that are 
formed on the basis of an extensive analysis of important problems and possible 
solutions. This theoretical lens has more in common with Kingdon’s policy 
stream model that emphasises the temporal coupling of the stream of problems, 
solutions and actors in contingent moments of decision (Kingdon 1984) than 
with the classical model of rational decision making and the modified version 
based on bounded or normative rationality. As such, the expectation will be that 
regional governance reforms are driven by chance discoveries, political impulses 
and contingent power struggles rather than conscious institutional designs. 
A last point is that the explanation of the Scandinavian reforms of county-
level governance cannot be viewed in isolation from reforms at other levels of 
governance. The last decades have seen the development of a complex, but well-
integrated, system of multi-level governance in which changes at one level of 
governance are often the result of changes at other levels. Hence, we shall argue 
that the recent reforms of the county governance systems, which in the Scandi-
navian countries have been much weaker than the local and national governance 
levels, must be explained, partly, as a spillover effect of local government re-
forms. As such, local government and county governance reforms are clearly 
intertwined and should be analysed as two sides of the same coin. 
Empirical analysis of the recent reform processes in the three Scandinavian 
countries will enable us to assess the extent to which these processes are charac-
terised by the varying forms of rational action that are explicitly or implicitly 
assumed by institutionalist theories, or whether, alternatively, they are driven by 
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more accidental articulations of problems, solutions and political opportunities 
and governance reforms at other levels of governance. 
Methodologically, the analysis consists of tracing the processes of territorial 
and regional reform in each country and interpreting the developments in the 
light of the theoretical framework. Different types of sources are used for the 
description and analysis. These include official policy documents such as gov-
ernment proposals and reports from government commissions. The study also 
draws on a re-analysis of previous research about territorial reforms in the three 
countries.  
 
The breakup of the coherent Scandinavian regional county 
model 1980-2014  
Regional governance reform in Denmark  
The well-prepared Danish local government reform in 1970 gave rise to a two-
tier system in which 275 municipalities were supplemented with 14 county 
councils. At both levels the administrative units were governed by directly elect-
ed councils that appointed a local or regional mayor, respectively. Both munici-
palities and county councils were given clearly defined tasks in terms of plan-
ning, regulation and service production together with their own independent 
taxing powers. However, the regional authority suffered from the lack of nation-
al political attention, the general indifference of the national mass media and a 
limited contact with citizens as their role in welfare provision was restricted to 
secondary service tasks such as public transport, upper secondary education and 
the provision of somatic and psychiatric health care and specialised social care. 
The somewhat weaker position of the county councils vis-à-vis the municipali-
ties was evidenced by the fact that the latter did not have the power to define and 
expand their own tasks in the same way as the municipalities could through the 
Local Government Act.  
In the 1980s and 1990s there were hardly any discussions of local govern-
ment reform. The attempt to curb the rise of public expenditure at the municipal 
level was the major bone of contention between central and local government, 
but did not trigger major reforms (Blom-Hansen et al. 2012). However, at the 
end of the period a mixture of practical geographical concerns and a general 
feeling that the municipalities in some areas were too small to deliver welfare 
services and policy solutions of sufficiently high quality spurred the proliferation 
of inter-municipal collaboration. Persistent unemployment combined with the 
New Regionalism agenda had also fostered an enhanced focus on regional 
growth. Still, there were no demands for amalgamation and large-scale local and 
regional governance reforms and in 1998 the Committee on Public Sector Re-
sponsibilities concluded that the existing division of tasks and responsibilities 
among state, county councils and municipalities was appropriate. There was 
apparently no need for any structural governance reforms. 
However, the Conservative party, which was a part of the Liberal coalition 
government from 2001-2011, kept arguing that the county councils should be 
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abolished in order to reduce the general level of taxation, which was assumed to 
be positively correlated with the number of administrative levels with taxing 
powers. The same argument was propagated by Danish Industry that sought to 
reduce the tax burden of private firms in order to enhance their competitiveness. 
Despite the growing, but scattered, demands for a major governance reform 
that was sporadically voiced in the media, the Minister of Economic and Domes-
tic Affairs in the spring of 2002 assured the public that the government had no 
intention of launching a large structural governance reform as there were no 
sound reasons to do so. Nevertheless, during the uneventful summer months 
national newspapers tempted some young members of parliament from the Con-
servative and Liberal government parties to support the idea of a structural gov-
ernance reform that would abolish the regions and create larger municipalities 
with an average of 30-50,000 inhabitants, which researchers believed was the 
optimal size in terms of efficiency and democracy. A number of important inter-
est organisations promptly declared their support for a structural governance 
reform. Hence, the idea of a major reform rapidly gained momentum in the Dan-
ish mass media and was finally endorsed by the government towards the end of 
the summer (Blom-Hansen, Elklit and Serritzlew 2006). Now, the problem was 
that, apparently, there were no sound reasons for carrying out a large-scale gov-
ernance reform. The government had entered into a Garbage-Can process in 
which it desperately needed to find one or more problems to match the new 
found solution (Bundgaard and Vrangbæk 2007; Christiansen and Klitgaard 
2008). In order to do so, it formed the Structural Reform Commission that con-
sisted of researchers, experts and representatives from universities, ministries, 
counties and municipalities, but had no participation of elected politicians.  
The Commission failed to demonstrate that larger municipalities would nec-
essarily be more efficient and more democratic, but argued that larger municipal-
ities would be more ‘sustainable’ in terms of providing professional welfare 
services of high quality close to the citizens. In January 2004 the Commission 
published its final report that recommended a structural governance reform 
based on fewer and larger municipalities (Strukturreformkommissionen 2004). 
Four different models were sketched out: The first enhanced the size of both 
municipalities and county councils, but preserved the division of labour between 
them. The second aimed at larger units, but expanded the portfolio of the county 
councils. The third abolished the county councils and transferred their tasks to 
the state and some new and larger municipalities. The final model sought to 
create larger municipalities with more tasks and a new regional level with fewer 
tasks. The government was clearly in favour of the last model, although it seri-
ously considered the third model, and after consultations with the municipalities 
and political negotiations with the opposition, the Danish Parliament passed a 
structural governance reform that reduced the 275 municipalities to 98 and re-
placed the 14 county councils with 5 new regions. The new and larger munici-
palities and the new regional authorities were created through amalgamation. 
The regional level of governance survived the sporadic political attempts to 
abolish it, but the price was high. Hence, the regional authorities were stripped 
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of a large number of responsibilities; which meant that the responsibility for 
regional roads, the provision of public transport, services to private enterprises, 
preventive health care and rehabilitation and environmental regulation were 
transferred to the municipalities. The municipalities were also mandated to take 
over the responsibility for the provision of specialised social care from the coun-
ties if they wanted to. Other tasks, such as the responsibility for secondary edu-
cation, were transferred to the state.  
Basically, the new and larger regions were left with only two major func-
tions from the former county councils: 1) growth and development through plan-
ning, development and coordination in the field of economic growth and em-
ployment, environmental protection, tourism, public transport and secondary 
education; and 2) somatic and psychiatric health care in the regional hospitals 
which is about the only area where the regional counties have clear operational 
functions.  
In both of these areas the regions must share their responsibilities with other 
actors. Hence, there is a mandatory Municipal Contact Committee in which the 
regions and the municipalities within their area coordinate their planning deci-
sions and their health and growth initiatives. The members are the mayors and 
the regional chairmen. There is also a mandatory Health Coordination Commit-
tee in which regional and municipal politicians negotiate and govern the joint 
health agreement that regulates prices and procedures in the area of preventive 
health care, somatic and psychiatric treatment and rehabilitation. Finally, it is 
required that the regions establish a Regional Growth Forum in which the region 
is represented together with the municipalities and a large number of public and 
private stakeholders. The Regional Growth Forum is a governance network that 
deals with all questions pertaining to regional growth and development (Søren-
sen, Reff Pedersen and Sehested 2011). The municipalities play a strong role in 
the Regional Growth Forums; not least because they coordinate their views and 
actions through discussions in the Municipal Coordination Councils that have 
been established in each of the five regions.  
The structural governance reform is first and foremost a story about a Gar-
bage-Can process in which contingent events and political impulses create a 
solution that is later matched with a problem (Christiansen and Klitgaard 2008). 
However, the reform is also a ‘chronicle of a death foretold’ as few people be-
lieve that the region will survive in the long run. They have lost many of their 
former tasks, and not succeeded in gaining new ones. As such, the governance of 
the active employment policy in Denmark is not a part of the portfolio of the 
regions, but placed in the hands of special-purpose state regions. Economically, 
the regional counties are heavily constrained. They are stripped of their taxing 
power and rely on government grants, hospital payments from the municipalities 
and funding from EU projects. Most of their economic resources come from the 
state, but they are not allowed to move state money flexibly from one main ac-
count to another. Last but not least, the political campaign to abolish the regions 
seems to continue, although so far it has not been possible to find an alternative 
way of governing the hospitals that, on the one hand, secures democratic ac-
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countability, and, on the other hand, ensures arm’s length distance from the state. 
Still, the expectation is that the new Liberal coalition-government will eventually 
remove the regional level and have some kind of corporate boards to run the 
hospitals. The election pledge of the Liberal party in the 2015 election was that 
the regions will be abolished if their performance is not significantly improved 
before the next election (Politiken 2015). 
In sum, it seems clear that the Danish reform of regional governance was 
part of a large-scale structural governance reform and that the changes at the 
regional level were largely a spillover from reforms aiming to create larger mu-
nicipalities. The political ambition to reduce overall taxation by reducing the 
number of administrative levels played a role in triggering the reform processes, 
but there were also other, but less explicit ambitions such as administrative ra-
tionalisation and enhanced capacity for contracting out public services. Howev-
er, the ambition to reduce taxation by abolishing the regional level of governance 
was unsuccessful since the regions survived, although stripped of their tradition-
al taxing powers. The new regions were also stripped of a large number of tasks 
and responsibilities and most of these were transferred to the municipalities that 
came out of the reform as the big winners. In terms of explaining the process and 
outcomes of the regional governance reform there is little support for a rational-
istic interpretation of the event. There is no evidence of big external socioeco-
nomic transformations and events that are changing the preferences of the social 
and political actors who ended up supporting the reform. What we find is rather 
a combination of accidental events whereby eager journalists looking for a good 
news story made it possible for the Conservative party and some business asso-
ciations to capture, but by no means control, the public agenda and generate 
support for a structural governance reform, despite the fact that an expert com-
mission had just concluded that the present governance system was well-
functioning and the government had endorsed the conclusions of the commis-
sion. The historical institutionalist argument about path-dependence and path-
shaping is undermined by the sudden launch of large-scale governance reform 
that was not triggered by any dislocating events shattering the old path and mak-
ing room for the shaping of a new one. Last but not least, the sociological institu-
tionalist argument about isomorphic pressures is problematized by the fact that 
there was hardly any reference to either municipal or regional governance re-
forms in other countries. The New Regionalism debate played no role in the 
Danish reforms that aimed to mitigate rather than expand the role of regional 
governance. 
 
Regional governance reforms in Sweden 
Sweden has a two-tier system of local government, which in 1980 consisted of 
279 municipalities and 24 county councils (landsting). Apart from Stockholm 
County Council, all county councils had the same functions. About 80 percent of 
the budgets concerned health care, including the responsibility for hospitals and 
local health centres. They were also in charge of care of rehabilitation and train-
ing for the disabled, public dental services, vocational colleges and secondary 
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schools, and support to regional cultural institutions and activities. In addition, 
county councils coordinated other actors, in particular municipalities, for the 
promotion of public health. Stockholm County Council had additional responsi-
bilities for public transport and regional planning. From 1981, public transport 
also became a task for the other county councils, although carried out jointly 
with the municipalities in the area. Hence, at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
second tier local authorities had practically the same functions over the whole 
country, with the exception that Stockholm County Council provided regional 
planning. 
Each county also has a county administrative board that handles central gov-
ernment functions in the area. This is headed by the county governor who – 
locally as well as nationally – is seen as the main representative of the county 
vis-à-vis central government. He/she is appointed by central government without 
any prior consultation with the county council. It may be seen as a paradox that 
this role is not carried out by an elected politician, but it reflects the belief 
among almost all parties that Sweden should remain a unitary state (Lidström 
and Eklund 2007). Also for this reason, a major function of the county adminis-
trative boards was to carry out central government regional policies in the county 
as well as having a number of controlling functions. There were also other spe-
cialised units of central government administration at regional level, with re-
sponsibility for mainly labour market policy, education and housing. As such, it 
is not surprising that the Swedish intermediate level was referred to as “the re-
gional mess” (Olsson and Åström 2004). There is a sharp contrast between this 
fragmented structure at regional level and the seeming rationality that character-
ises both the municipal and central government levels. 
From the unified county council model that existed around 1980, a number 
of reforms have been carried out that have made the second tier more diversified. 
Within health care perhaps the most significant change has been the general 
increase in the number of private entrepreneurs, in particular in primary care. 
Although data is not available about private provision of these services in 1980, 
it was practically non-existent at that time, whereas by 2009, a quarter of all 
primary care was provided by private health clinics on an entrepreneurial basis. 
They are still fully financed by tax money together with a user’s fee, but they are 
free to organise their activities differently than the county councils’ own clinics. 
However, the extent to which citizens have access to private care depends on the 
county. Half the primary care in Stockholm is provided by such clinics whereas 
it is less than ten percent in more peripheral counties such as Norrbotten, Dalar-
na, Värmland and Blekinge (Anell 2011).  
The changes have been even more profound with regard to the responsibility 
for regional economic development policies. The national regional policies that 
were initiated during the 1960s and remained until the 1980s emphasised a 
strong position for central government with unified national policies and redis-
tribution of resources from wealthier to weaker parts of the country. The county 
administrative boards and the county governor had an important role as the long 
The Scandinavian Regional Model  
 
 
 
 
19 
arm of central government in implementing these policies and also by coordinat-
ing other actors who were relevant for the development of the county.  
With the Swedish EU membership in 1995 and with neo-liberal ideas about 
the competitive region, responsibility for regional policies gradually shifted from 
state agencies to regional and local self-governing actors (Hudson 2006, 
Hörnström 2013). This was a clear adjustment to the European New Regional-
ism agenda. Instead of redistribution, economic development was seen as a task 
for local and regional interests, such as the county council, municipalities and 
local businesses. These were expected to identify and develop the assets in the 
county. The county administrative boards were initially in charge of setting up 
and coordinating regional partnerships between these interests but responsibility 
was later transferred to local and regional units of self-government, but faster in 
some parts of the country than other. 
These changes coincided with attempts to restructure the intermediate level 
by amalgamating county councils into larger regions. The division in counties in 
Sweden originates from a revision of the constitution in 1634, when Sweden was 
a great power, and was aimed at facilitating central control over the country’s 
territory. Gradually, and in particular from the 1970s, it became obvious that the 
existing division into counties was outdated, as functional areas of economic 
activity and citizen mobility followed other patterns. 
The county structure was regarded to be particularly problematic in two 
parts of the country. The greater Göteborg commuting area along the west coast 
crossed three counties and in Skåne, in southern Sweden, the region had been 
artificially divided into two counties – Malmöhus län and Kristianstads län, after 
being annexed from Denmark in 1658. In both of these areas there were pres-
sures not only from municipal and county council politicians to establish larger 
regions, but also from local and regional business interests. As the EU empha-
sised the regional level, the Swedish membership of the European Union in 1995 
was an additional support for reform (Lidström 2010a). The parliament accepted 
the creation of the two new regions on an experimental basis, Skåne in 1997 and 
Västra Götaland one year later. As a way of gaining legitimacy among the mu-
nicipalities in the region as a whole, the municipalities in Västra Götaland were 
represented in its decision-making structure. In line with New Regionalism prin-
ciples mentioned previously, the regional development functions were trans-
ferred from the county administrative boards to these regions.  
A more large-scale reform, following the models of Skåne and Västra Gö-
taland, was proposed by a parliamentary committee – the Committee on Public 
Sector Responsibilities – in 2007. It was suggested that all county councils 
should be replaced by 6-9 regional authorities with responsibility for all the 
existing county council functions as well as for regional development (Ansvar-
skommittén 2007). Each region should meet a number of criteria such as having 
at least one million inhabitants, having a regional hospital and not dividing up 
commuting areas. Again, New Regionalism can be seen as being strongly re-
flected in Swedish policy proposals. However, despite being supported by all 
political parties in the committee, the non-socialist government and in particular 
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the Conservative party vetoed the comprehensive reform proposal as it was 
afraid that the regional level would become too powerful and costly. Neverthe-
less, Skåne and Västra Götaland were granted permanent status as regions. In 
addition, two already existing county councils – Halland and Gotland -were also 
given responsibility for regional development, although without being amalga-
mated with neighbours. This came as a surprise as none of them met the criteria 
set up by the Committee of Public Sector Responsibilities. Hence, at this time, 
Sweden had four regions. 
In parallel with these reforms, a new type of regional co-operation council 
was introduced from 2003. This was a joint body of the county council and the 
municipalities and required the consent of all of them to be established. Its deci-
sion-makers were appointed by its member authorities. However, once in place, 
significant funding and the role as the coordinator of regional development was 
transferred from the county administrative board. In addition, the county council 
moved its regional development and cultural functions to the council and the 
municipalities also contributed with resources. Hence, in these counties, the 
regional co-operation council became the main regional development and coor-
dinating actor. Thirteen such councils were set up, up until 2011. In the four 
remaining counties the regional development responsibility remained with the 
county administrative boards (Sveriges kommuner och landsting 2013).  
However, the process of gradually increasing the number of regions is con-
tinuing. From 2015, six of the counties with regional co-operation councils have 
been granted formal status as regions, replacing both the county councils and the 
cooperative councils. An additional three counties will be granted regional status 
from 2017. The Social Democratic-Environmental Party government, in power 
from 2014, has indicated that it aims to create larger regions. However, for the 
time being, the anomalies identified by the Committee of Public Sector Respon-
sibilities, such as labour market areas extending across county borders, will 
remain. Despite the new government initiatives the intermediate level in Sweden 
will, by 2017, be highly diversified and consist of:  
 
• 2 amalgamated regions with extended functions for the re-
gional development of the area (Skåne and Västra Götaland) 
• 11 regions with similar functions but with territories corre-
sponding to existing county councils (Halland and Gotland, 
then an additional six from 2015 and three from 2017) 
• 7 county councils where regional development functions are 
handled by regional co-operative councils consisting of rep-
resentatives of the county council and all municipalities, and 
• Stockholm County Council where no changes are made, i.e. 
regional coordination is a responsibility of the county ad-
ministrative board although the county council is in charge 
of the regional plan. 
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The second tier in Sweden has gone from being a coherent level of government 
with a common set of functions in the early 1980s to being highly diverse in 
terms of status and functions within the field of regional development. It is also 
noteworthy that these regional reforms have followed very different paths than 
previous territorial restructuring. Two municipal amalgamation reforms, imple-
mented between 1952 and 1974, were comprehensive, compulsory and centrally 
driven. Regionalisation reform, on the other hand, has been much more piece-
meal, voluntary and dependent on initiatives from the local and county levels 
(Lidström 2010b). Indeed, the lack of a coherent government policy is striking 
but may largely be explained by the reluctance of the Conservative party, having 
a veto position, to allow a stronger intermediate level of government. It is obvi-
ous that the attempts to carry out the comprehensive restructuring of the inter-
mediate level have failed, at least temporarily. Although clearly influenced by 
the New Regionalist agenda, the current outcome became a mix of different 
types of solutions, varying from large and powerful regions to a retained central 
government control over regional development at county level. 
The transformation of the regional level in Sweden can hardly be understood 
as designed according to rational principles. Despite a clear attempt, manifested 
through the comprehensive analyses and suggestions of the Committee of Public 
Sector Responsibilities, reforms have been piecemeal and driven according to 
specific regional agendas and within the limits set up by what the dominant 
government party at the time, the Conservatives, were willing to accept. Alt-
hough the continuing existence of the counties can be seen as an expression of 
path-dependency, this has only been possible to break in two cases, the regions 
of Skåne and Västra Götaland. Finally, there are no signs of learning from expe-
rience in the other Scandinavian countries, although those in favour of reform 
seem to see the need for the intermediate level of government to be legitimate in 
the eyes of the EU and regions in other European countries. However, on the 
whole, regional reform in Sweden and in particular the way the responsibility for 
regional development is implemented differently in different counties, seems 
more driven by impulse, and specific local and regional agendas. 
 
Regional governance reform in Norway 
By 1980 Norway had a two-tier system of local government similar to the mod-
els in Denmark and Sweden. At the time Norway had 19 county councils, which 
still remain, and 454 municipalities, a number that since then has been slightly 
reduced to 4281. Even though the county councils are very old political and ad-
ministrative units in Norway, they were substantially reformed in 1976, from 
regional coordination bodies governed by a council of indirectly elected repre-
sentatives to full-scale regional governments with directly elected councilors and 
with their own resources based on a fixed income tax (Flo 2000). By 1980 there 
was also, and still is, a regional governor in each county, a central government 
regional office responsible for control, regulation and inspection of county coun-
                                                
1 Norwegian counties and municipalities are smaller than their Swedish and Danish counterparts.  
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cils and municipalities. The governor is appointed by central government, and 
following a long-standing tradition he/she is generally a retired member of the 
parliament. 
From 1980 and onwards the Norwegian county councils ran the hospitals, 
while local medical services, in contrast to Sweden, were operated by the munic-
ipalities. The county councils were also, and still are, responsible for public 
dental care and secondary education. They were also important bodies in the 
sector of transportation with a responsibility for regional roads and public 
transport in their area, for regional development and special instruments for rural 
development, and they were responsible for regional planning. Many of these 
functions are still carried out by the county councils, but some of them in a re-
vised form, as we will get back to below. 
The first reform that fundamentally changed the Norwegian regional level 
after 1976 took place in 2001, when the hospitals were taken over by the state. 
The county councils had for several years been criticised for a lack of regional 
priorities and weak budget control in the health sector. The new reform was 
aiming to improve these conditions (Byrkjeflot and Neby 2008). 
The hospital reform removed almost two-thirds of the county councils’ ac-
tivities (Bukve 2012: 27). Shortly afterwards the county councils themselves 
became an issue in the public debate. The two main right-wing parties both 
committed themselves to abolishing the county councils, and to develop a single-
tier system of local government. On the other side, the left-wing parties and in 
particular parts of the Labour party, argued for larger and more empowered 
regions – resembling some of the arguments associated with the New Regional-
ism Agenda (Baldersheim 2011; Hörnström 2013). Among the parties there were 
also voices, especially from the political centre, in favour of regions smaller than 
the existing counties. Still, in most, if not all, parties there was discussion, oppo-
sition and resistance expressed from below, from regional political leaders, fear-
ing loss of power and redistribution of influence in their disfavour. Since few 
parties and no government coalition were able to agree on such a complex issue, 
the debate on the regional structure soon ran into a state of deadlock, and the 
status quo was seen as the only possible common denominator (Vebostad 2013).  
During the years of discussion over the county structure, important changes 
also took place in various parts of central government administration. Most min-
istries have some kind of regional structure, but this is not necessarily coordinat-
ed with the division in counties nor with the regional governors. This applies for 
example to the national road authorities, police authorities and the Norwegian 
Tax Administration. These authorities, and many more, were explicitly or im-
plicitly allowed to choose a regional structure of their own, which resulted in a 
very complex regional division of the Norwegian political system as a whole. 
Many of the administrative regions developed in this period stretch over several 
counties, some coincide with the existing counties, and some cover smaller areas 
(Hansen and Stigen 2012: 78). Future efforts to construct new regions with new 
tasks will face a challenge, since the transfer of tasks between levels of govern-
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ments will involve the restructuring of existing administrative regions for the 
tasks in question.   
Despite a lack of reform in the geographical structure, the government and 
parliament managed to agree on a regional reform in 2007 that was effectuated 
by 2010. This “administration reform” (forvaltningsreformen) ascribes new roles 
to the county councils, strengthening their functions as agents for regional de-
velopment, and their coordination role in various policy fields (NOU 2000:22, 
St.meld. nr. 12 2006-2007). Many observers would probably argue that there is a 
substantial distance between the rhetoric by which the reform was introduced 
and the changes that actually took place (Hansen and Stigen 2012; St. meld. Nr. 
25, 2008-2009). With regard to service delivery, the county councils retained 
responsibility for secondary education and public dental care. They were given 
new tasks in the field of transportation, where 80 percent of the national road 
network (smaller roads) and ferries were transferred to the regional level (Leiren 
and Krogstad 2014). However, the most important change in the 2010 reform 
was the effort to develop county councils into “network nodes”. 
The network functions were most visible in three areas. First, in the area of 
regional development, in which county councils traditionally have had a coordi-
nating role, the reform in 2010 transferred additional responsibilities to the local 
and regional levels to strengthen growth, employment and coordination by build-
ing on qualities of places, regional and local possibilities and preferences. New 
and vitalized planning tools were assigned to the county councils with the revi-
sion of the Planning and Building Act in 2008. Second, the counties were as-
signed an important coordination role as River Basin District Authorities in the 
implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive (Klausen 2012). Third, 
county councils were given the new task of promoting public health through 
their own policies and activities, and in collaboration with local governments in 
the region (Helgesen 2012). 
When comparing the type of county council Norway had in 1980 with that 
of today, the differences are striking. Most importantly, the former role as ser-
vice provider has partly been replaced by that of a coordination function or a 
network node. However, the political and administrative structure of the Norwe-
gian county councils has only been changed to a lesser extent during this period. 
Direct political elections and the separate tax income, both celebrated as main 
pillars of regional self-governance in the 1976 reform have been retained. So has 
the geographical division into 19 counties. However, it is hard to predict for how 
long this model will last. In June 2014 the Norwegian Parliament agreed to initi-
ate a regional reform in tandem with an ongoing municipal reform. By the end of 
2015, it is still an open question how the regional level will be reformed. 
Summing up, there seems no obvious and single factor explaining the over-
all change in Norwegian regional governance from 1980 up to today. Referring 
to the theoretical perspectives discussed initially, it seems unlikely that the frag-
mented and chaotic reform process is grounded in rational choice institutional-
ism, departing from a national government’s master plan. On the other hand, the 
fact that the number of county councils and the county borders have stayed intact 
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since 1976 could very well indicate some kind of institutional inertia and path 
dependency in line with historical institutionalism. However, this suggestion is 
clearly contradicted by the 2001 reform, when the important hospital sector was 
taken over by the state. The hospital reform seems more like a typical neo-liberal 
reform, and - in the theoretical context of historical institutionalism - a critical 
juncture more than a continuation. Referring to sociological institutionalism one 
would expect that the Norwegian development followed contemporary trends 
and presumptions, such as New Regionalism. In some respects, sociological 
institutionalism can explain the neo-liberal hospital reform, but there is no obvi-
ous factor accounting for the reform process as a whole. For example, few if any 
countries outside Norway have assigned coordination as the main task for re-
gional elected governments. All-in-all it seems that macro theories fail to explain 
the overall development from 1980 onwards.  
Turning to meso- and micro-explanations, we may be able to explain sepa-
rate parts of the process, such as reform initiatives vetoed by particular political 
parties, certain party organisations that were not able to agree on a regional 
structure, and specific neo-liberal reform initiatives. We therefore suggest that 
the present Norwegian system for regional governance is more an aggregate of 
numerous separate events, rather than a product of conscious institutional design. 
 
Conclusions 
Forty years ago, a fairly common intermediate level of government existed in the 
three Scandinavian countries. The amtskommuner, fylkeskommuner and land-
sting had several functions in common, a similar position vis-à-vis central gov-
ernment and were, on average, of the same size. After a number of reforms, this 
level of governance has been transformed, but in very different directions in the 
three countries. In Sweden, within-county differences have also increased. This 
paper has addressed the question of how this transformation from uniformity to 
diversity can be understood.  
Three theories of institutional changes – rational choice institutionalism, his-
torical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism – all provide important 
insights, but neither of them seems to offer a suitable framework for explaining 
Scandinavian county reforms. Each of them seems to be contradicted by empiri-
cal events and they all suffer from an overly rationalistic view of policy making 
that is difficult to sustain in the light of the empirical developments that tend to 
result from a complex interaction between political and institutional contingen-
cies. 
Contrary to the stipulations of rational choice institutionalism, the county 
governance structures have not been subject to continuous adjustments to new 
and changing preferences and political and socioeconomic conditions. Even 
when taking into consideration that we are talking about reforms of constitution-
al rules, which are more difficult to change than collective or operational rules, 
there seems to be no ‘efficiency of history’ ensuring a near-perfect match be-
tween the governance structures and the external environment. In all three coun-
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tries there have been several aborted reform initiatives indicating that structural, 
institutional and political constraints play an important role in preventing inten-
tional reforms.    
The clear constraints on intentional reform resonate somewhat better with 
the path-dependency argument advanced by historical institutionalism. However, 
the new and emerging governance models represent significant breaks with the 
past and thus defy the idea of a stable path with only small and incremental 
changes. Amalgamations of county councils in Sweden, the construction of five 
new regions without taxing power in Denmark, and the stripping of key func-
tions from the Norwegian county councils are deviations from the existing paths 
and cannot be explained by the presence of cataclysmic crises that have led to 
the creation of critical junctures and the shaping of new paths. 
Last but not least, although there has been some piecemeal learning from the 
New Regionalism in Sweden and Norway, there seem to be practically no signs 
of inspiration or learning between the Scandinavian countries, or from other 
countries, with regard to the governance models that have been adopted. The 
Scandinavian countries have not attempted to copy or mimic and apparently 
there has been no need to legitimise the Scandinavian county governance re-
forms in the wider European context. 
Despite the fact that decision-making rationality has previously been identi-
fied as a defining characteristic of the Scandinavian countries (Anton, 1969; 
Gustafson and Richardson, 1979; Christensen et al 2002), there seems to be an 
apparent lack of rationality in the Scandinavian reform processes. County re-
forms have either been a result of a combination of contingent events and politi-
cal whim or been vetoed by a single political party. Hence, we find strong sup-
port for non-rational explanations emphasising contingent articulations of policy 
problems, governance solutions, emerging conditions and opportunities for deci-
sion making. Rather than being rational, political actors seem to have been driv-
en by impulse, tactical games and idiosyncratic beliefs. County reforms must 
also be understood as effects of spillovers from decisions about changes at other 
levels of government. This includes strengthening the position of Danish munic-
ipalities and centralising responsibility for hospitals in Norway. 
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